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TEMPORARY CONTRACTS AND MANUFACTURING FIRMS’ OUTCOMES IN 
SPAIN: A CURVILINEAR EXAMINATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This work contributes to research on temporary employment, specifically through an analysis 
of its effect on firm efficacy. We analyze the potential curvilinear (nonlinear) relationship 
between temporary contracts and organizational outcomes and examine how the proportion of 
indirect temporary workers—hired through Temporary Help Agencies (THAs)—influences 
this relationship in a sample of 1,597 Spanish manufacturing firms. We find a negative linear 
relationship between temporary contracts and labor productivity and a predominantly positive 
concave downward curve between temporary contracts and gross operating margin. This 
curvilinear relationship is especially stronger when the proportion of indirect temporary 
contracts is low, and we find that the use of temporary contracts has a positive effect on gross 
operating margin, but this effect becomes negative with overuse. This empirical evidence 
partially questions the dominant linear paradigm that has been established over the past few 
decades in the labor flexibility literature at an organizational level.  
 
Keywords - Temporary employment, curvilinear relationship, types of temporary 
employment, labor flexibility, organizational outcomes. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Faced with incessantly increasing competition and uncertainty, organizations need the 
capacity to adapt quickly to market fluctuations and changes in their environment to maintain 
their competitiveness and survive. This requirement for flexibility has appeared in various 
organizational aspects, affecting competitive strategies, production methods, the design of 
organizational structures and human resource management (Atkinson, 1984; Michie and 
Sheehan, 2001). In this last aspect, capacity to adapt is defined as labor flexibility. This 
concept covers very different kinds of human resource management policies and practices, 
which have been grouped into two basic categories: internal or functional flexibility, and 
external or numerical flexibility (Kalleberg, 2001; McIlroy, et al., 2004; Roca-Puig et al., 
2008a). Internal labor flexibility refers to the firm’s efforts to incorporate and develop 
workers’ competences and skills, so that a worker can be assigned to other jobs or 
departments within the firm. External labor flexibility concerns the capacity to change the 
number of workers hired in order to quickly and efficiently adapt the volume of work to 
changes in demand. 
In the last few years recourse to external labor flexibility has become the central core 
around which employment policy––seeking a solution to unemployment––has been based in 
the European Union (EC, 2005, 2010). In particular, in Spain, firms have developed external 
labor flexibility largely through temporary contracts, rather than through other practices such 
as part-time work or subcontracting (EC, 2005, 2010; Sánchez and Toharia, 2000). The 
generalization of this type of contract in Spain has led to the so-called “temporary contract 
culture” (Toharia, 2005). As a result, much of the empirical research in the Spanish setting 
focuses on the individual level of analysis, characterizing temporary jobs, identifying the 
reasons why they are intensively used and their impact on workers’ attitudes (e.g. Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2000; De Cuyper et al., 2009; Silla et al., 2005). A similar approach has been taken 
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in research in the European setting (e.g., De Cuyper and De Witte, 2007; Lozza et al., 2013; 
Mauno et al., 2012). However, in Spain, as well as in other countries, at the organizational 
level of analysis the empirical literature examining the effect of temporary contracts––as the 
predominant form of external labor flexibility––on firm performance is still scarce (Forrier 
and Sels, 2003; Lepak et al., 2003) and apparently contradictory.  
Authors such as Cardon (2003), Davis-Blake et al. (2003), George (2003), Lepak et al. 
(2003) and Valverde et al. (2000) warn of the paradoxical effect that the use of temporary 
contracts can have on organizational outcomes: on the one hand, they are beneficial in that 
they allow firms to adapt to market fluctuations more rapidly, to obtain specialized services or 
skills that are not available in-house, and to reduce labor costs; however, they are also costly 
since they are a barrier to temporary workers’ motivation and integration in the firm, and may 
lead to conflicts between temporary and permanent workers. Therefore, the use of temporary 
contracts derives in uncertain organizational outcomes, and contradictory results are 
frequently found in the empirical literature analyzing the effect of temporary contracts on 
organizational outcomes (De Cuyper et al, 2008). On the one hand, there are studies that point 
to the existence of a positive effect (Lepak et al., 2003; Valverde et al., 2000). On the other 
hand, however, other researchers demonstrate a negative effect (De Grip and Sieben, 2005; 
Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 2004). Lastly, still other works find no significant effect (Matías-
Reche, 2003; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001; Roca-Puig et al., 2008a). Consequently, an 
intense debate currently surrounds the issue of how useful temporary hiring is at firm level.  
Our central aim in this paper is to reconcile these apparently conflicting results by 
proposing that a curvilinear relationship exists between temporary contracts and 
organizational outcomes. In this respect, Aiken and West (1991) and Pierce and Aguinis 
(2013) note that when opposing theoretical proposals forecast relationships where two 
variables have different signs, and when empirical studies produce mixed results, the 
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possibility should be considered that the relationship between these two variables might be 
curvilinear. In this case, a point of inflection (maximum and minimum of the curve) is seen 
where the change of sign occurs, and therefore a negative relationship can coexist with a 
positive relationship. Since the presence of curvilinear relationships has been noted in some 
domains, a paradigmatic shift from linear to curvilinear models is needed to improve 
management theory and practice (Pierce and Aguinis, 2013). In other words, we can explain 
the inconsistent findings with respect to the impact of temporary employment on 
organizational outcomes by introducing the level of temporary contracts that already exists in 
the firm as a potential moderator. The quadratic component of temporary contracts in a 
regression equation mathematically represents this moderator (i.e. curvilinear) effect in our 
study. 1  Aunque previous empirical studies have explored how the relationship between 
temporary employment and organizational outcomes can be modified by other human 
resource practices and contextual factors (e.g., Lepak et al., 2003; Michie and Sheehan, 2001; 
Roca-Puig et al., 2008a), curiously, the degree to which a firm utilizes temporary hiring has 
not yet been analyzed as a moderator variable. The main contribution of this study is to bridge 
this gap.  
We expect to find significant differences in organizational outcomes not only across 
varying levels of temporary contract use, but also across types of temporary contracts. 
Temporary work is not a homogeneous category (Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006; De 
Cuyper et al, 2008; Houseman et al., 2003; Mitlacher, 2007). The implication for 
organizations contracting temporary labor services for different types of temporary 
employment, in particular the use of Temporary Help Agencies (THAs) as opposed to short-
term direct employment arrangements, is still an issue that requires further investigation 
(Houseman et al., 2003). Indirect temporary contracts represent a special kind of temporary 
                                                 
1 The nonlinear relations can be conceptualized as a special case of the more general moderated relations (Pierce 
and Aguinis, 2013). 
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employment, in which workers are legally employed by an external agency and work on a 
day-to-day basis at the premises of another firm (García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005). 
This position gives rise to questions such as whether the relationship between temporary 
hiring and organizational outcomes differs according to the proportion of temporary agency 
employment in relation to direct-hire temporaries. The second aim of this paper is to provide a 
response to this question. 
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Temporary contracts in Spain 
If one is looking for a country in which to test the effect of temporary contracts on 
organizational outcomes, Spain provides a fascinating case study because Spanish firms have 
developed external labor flexibility mainly through temporary contracts (Dolado et al., 2002). 
Figures from the last decade reveal that Spain has the highest proportion of temporary 
contracts in the European Union, twice the rate of countries such as France or Germany, and 
more than three times that of Belgium or Italy (EC, 2005, 2010). This proportion is nearly 
twice that of the United States (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000). The generalized use of temporary 
contracts in Spain needs to be understood in its own socioeconomic context. It is necessary to 
locate issues of flexibility more securely within both existing national regulatory and 
institutional frameworks (Blyton and Martínez-Lucio, 1995; Kalleberg, 2001). The serious 
unemployment situation in the ’80s in Spain led to temporary contracts becoming generally 
permitted without the need for explanations (Toharia, 2005) 2 . Even after the regulation 
reforms of 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2010, introduced to stimulate permanent contracts, Spanish 
governments have not been very successful in their attempts to reduce temporary hiring 
                                                 
2 Unemployment has been a major feature in the Spanish labor market’s recent history, reaching rates greater 
20% al least three times since early 1980s: the worst performance of the EU-27, with a rate of 21.52% in the 
third quarter of 2011 (Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-Lucio, 2012). 
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(Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-Lucio, 2012; Ortega and Marchante, 2010). From 1990 
to 2007 the temporary contract rate in Spain remained constantly above 30% (EC, 2010). In 
recent years this rate has fallen slightly to around 25%, due in part to the 2006 labor reform 
(see figure 1). For example, Eurostat figures for 2011 show that the average percentage of 
employees with a temporary contract in Spain reached 25.3%, whereas the average for the 
EU-27 was 14.1%. As regards distribution by sector, table 1 shows that the largest proportion 
of workers on temporary contracts in Spain is concentrated in the service sector, with a 
percentage of around 73% of the total in recent years, whereas in other sectors this percentage 
is much lower, lying at around 10% in the industrial sector.  
    ----------------------- 
Insert Figure 1   
------------------------ 
    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 1   
------------------------ 
In addition, the regulation of the Spanish labor market has also attempted to gradually 
secure the same working conditions for temporary workers as for permanent employees3; 
however in practice, major differences still remain between the two (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; 
Díaz-Mayans and Sanchez, 2004; ICEDS, 2005; Toharia, 2005). In Spain, temporary work 
contracts generally offer poorer working conditions than permanent work contracts (Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2002). Most temporary employees contracted by firms typically earn lower wages, 
have a lower educational level, precarious work, job insecurity, limited development and 
                                                 
3 In general, all the recent labor market reforms contain restrictions on the successive use of temporary contracts, 
reductions in the cost of firing permanent employees, increases in fiscal support for the creation of jobs with new 
permanent contracts, and transitory incentives to convert temporary contracts into permanent ones (Ortega and 
Marchante, 2010).  
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promotion opportunities and exhibit weaker employment relationships than permanent staff 
(EC, 2005; ICEDS, 2005; Roca-Puig et al., 2008a; Toharia, 2005). Furthermore, temporary 
employment in Spain is clearly involuntary and is not an effective vehicle for moving into 
permanent employment (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2000; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2008). The 
available evidence suggests that temporary posts are subject to high turnover, contradicting 
the “causality principle” under which temporary contracts are supposed to be used only for 
transitory needs of firms (EC, 2005; Roca-Puig et al., 2008a; Toharia, 2005). As a result, 
there is a pronounced segmentation (i.e. dualism) in the Spanish labor market (Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2000; Dolado et al., 2002; Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-Lucio, 2012), in line 
with the core vs. peripheral employee model put forward by Atkinson (1984), in which firms 
make an explicit distinction between the two types of worker according to job tasks and type 
of contract. While core workers carry out the basic tasks in the organization and enjoy 
permanent contracts, peripheral employees only carry out accessory tasks and are 
predominantly hired on a temporary basis.  
Despite the speed with which agency work has grown since its emergence in Spain 
(García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005), most temporary contracts are made directly with the 
worker, without the intermediary services of a Temporary Help Agency (THA) (De la Calle et 
al., 2007). THAs offer employment contracts of limited duration to jobseekers and assign 
them to client firms wishing to hire them to perform jobs of a temporary nature (García-Pérez 
and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005). Table 2 shows that Spain has a reduced number of agency workers, 
similar to other EU countries such as Italy, but much lower than the UK. The way this type of 
work is regulated, whether by legislation or by collective agreements, varies from one country 
to another depending on each country’s traditional labor practice and, in the final instance, 
explains the differences in growth rates of the agency work industry. In most European Union 
countries, these firms operate as comprehensive employment agencies; in Spain, however, it 
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was not until the recent labor reform Law 3/2012, of February 10, that THAs could operate as 
private recruitment agencies, managing the entire human resources value chain and working 
directly with the public employment services. This circumstance may explain the traditional 
low rate of THA penetration in Spain. Moreover, according to the CIETT (2010), the sectorial 
distribution of agency work in Europe has seen a recent trend away from usage in the 
industrial sector (33% of total agency workers), towards a growing use in the service sector 
(43% of total agency workers). In Spain, the use of agency work in the service sector is 
particularly high (62%), and is lower in the manufacturing sector (33%) and other sectors (5%) 
such as construction and agriculture (CIETT, 2010). The use of THAs is therefore 
concentrated in the service sector.  
    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 2   
------------------------ 
2.2. The benefits and costs of temporary contracts: a curvilinear view 
The literature on labor flexibility highlights the beneficial aspects of temporary hiring 
for firms through improved temporal adaptation of staff requirements and availabilities to 
changing conditions in increasingly uncertain markets. Specifically, two types of positive 
effects are identified: external, through increased revenues; and internal, through reduced 
labor costs (De Grip and Sieben, 2005; Kleinknecht et al., 2006; Matusik and Hill, 1998; 
Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007). The external effect occurs when temporary workers are used as a 
means of accessing valuable knowledge for new services and for high quality products, which 
is reflected in increased revenues (Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006; Cardon, 2003; Matusik 
and Hill, 1998). These highly skilled professionals and technical experts in temporary 
employment create new and specific knowledge within the organizations that engage them; 
this knowledge would not otherwise be developed internally, and is especially valuable in 
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dynamic and competitive industries. These types of temporary workers enjoy similar work 
conditions to permanent workers and, consequently, identical (sometimes better) employment 
relationships with the organizations. The internal effect involves the use of temporary workers 
as a way to reduce labor costs. Temporary workers may be hired and paid only when there is 
work to be done (for example, during transitory production peaks), generally earn less than 
comparable permanent employees and may not be entitled to all the benefits that tenured 
employees tend to receive from their employers (for example, pension scheme payments or 
health insurance plans), and can be dismissed more easily and cheaply in adverse 
circumstances, thus bringing down fixed labor costs (Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006; 
Houseman, 2001; Lepak et al., 2003; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001). External and internal 
effects may be incompatible, since while the former require highly qualified temporary 
workers, the latter demand precisely the opposite (Blyton and Morris, 1992; Kleinknecht et al., 
2006; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001). The much higher use of temporary contracts to fill 
job vacancies that require lower qualifications indicates that Spanish firms have turned to 
temporary hiring practices essentially as a way of reducing their labor costs (Dolado et al., 
2002; ICEDS, 2005; Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007).  
At the same time, however, temporary hiring generates costs or disadvantages that 
undermine firm productivity. Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez (2004) and Bentolila and Dolado 
(1993) argue that temporary workers may be less efficient than permanent workers, either 
because of their intrinsic qualities (if they are less capable) or because of their attitude (if they 
put in less effort). Without doubt, the lower educational level of most temporary workers in 
Spain and the scant investment in training these workers on the part of firms (EC, 2005; 
ICEDS 2005) lowers the firm’s level of capacity and human capital and, therefore, may 
decrease labor productivity (Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 2004; Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007). 
Likewise, the poor labor conditions temporary workers face (Amuedo-Dorantes, 2002) lower 
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their level of attachment to an organization (Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 2004). There is some 
evidence to suggest that employers’ use of temporary employment is due to pressures on labor 
costs. Forde and Slater (2006) and Houseman (2001) report that although few employers said 
they used temporary employment in order to save on labor costs (wage, pension, health 
insurance other social expenditures), employers primarily do make savings by using these 
arrangements. These employment conditions make it difficult for temporary workers to 
commit to the organization.  
A second disadvantage is the appearance of conflict or tension between temporary and 
permanent workers that can lessen efficiency among permanent workers (Broschak and 
Davis-Blake 2006; Davis-Blake et al., 2003; George, 2003). This happens, for instance, when 
managers increase the permanent workers’ responsibilities—by requiring them to supervise 
temporary workers and take responsibility for their mistakes—without any corresponding 
remuneration (Davis-Blake et al., 2003); or through increased perception of employment 
insecurity among permanent workers because on occasions, managers may use temporary 
workers to send out the message that permanent employees can easily be replaced if their 
efforts decline, thereby creating a destructive working environment in which permanent 
workers regard their temporary colleagues as a threat (De Cuyper et al., 2009; Davis-Blake et 
al., 2003). Similarly, temporary workers speed up the mobility of higher-level permanent 
employees, while slowing down the mobility of those in lower-level jobs, and weaken the 
permanent workers’ trust in the organization (George, 2003). In the Spanish context, Sánchez 
and Toharia (2000) report that the presence of temporary workers holds down permanent 
workers’ salary levels, which has a negative effect on their motivation and effort. For all these 
reasons, permanent workers may view the level of temporary contracts as an indicator of the 
organization’s low-level commitment to them (George, 2003). 
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This conflict between temporary and permanent workers only reaches serious levels in 
firms with a high proportion of temporary contracts (Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006; De 
Cuyper et al., 2009; George 2003). The higher the proportion of temporary workers, the 
greater the negative effect will be. A minimal use of temporary contracts is not expected to 
strongly influence permanent workers’ trust in the organization, but greater magnitudes of 
temporary contracts can seriously undermine the relationship between organizations and their 
permanent workers (George, 2003). In particular, De Cuyper et al., (2009) show that the 
percentage of temporary workers related positively to shared perceptions of job insecurity 
among permanent workers in Spain. Furthermore, in a firm with a high proportion of 
temporary contracts, some of their basic activities, the source of their competitive advantage, 
will probably be carried out by temporary workers. This may cause damage to the firm if the 
performance of these basic tasks deteriorates significantly when these workers leave, or if it 
makes imitation by other competitor firms easier (Cardon, 2003; Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 
2004; Matusik and Hill, 1998). In summary, a high proportion of temporary contracts 
substantially increases the costs of temporary hiring, and probably outweighs any benefits, 
thus producing a negative effect of temporary hiring on the firm’s results. In contrast, a lower 
proportion of temporary contracts is more likely to have a positive effect. This conjecture 
implies that a breakeven point exists, in which the benefits and costs of temporary hiring 
balance each other out and maximum organizational effectiveness is achieved. Authors such 
as Cardon (2003), Foote and Folta (2002), Roca-Puig et al., (2008b) and Toharia (2005) have 
argued that there is a point at which the balance of temporary and permanent workers offers 
some optimal level of overall firm performance. We thus posit the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 1. There is a concave downward curvilinear relationship between 
temporary hiring and organizational outcomes: the higher the proportion of 
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temporary contracts, the less positive the effect of temporary hiring on 
organizational outcomes will be.  
2.3. Direct and indirect temporary hiring 
Although the benefits and costs described above apply to any type of temporary 
employment, it is useful to distinguish whether the organizations contracting temporary labor 
services do so via an agency—indirect temporary contracts—or though a direct employment 
contract—direct temporary contracts. Houseman (2001), Mitlacher (2007), De la Calle et al. 
(2007) and Muñoz-Bullón and Rodes (2004) argue that indirect temporary hiring entails a 
further set of advantages for client firms over direct temporary hiring. Firstly, THAs can offer 
a faster and more efficient service, since they have a database of potential workers who have 
already been through the selection process. This is a particularly important factor when 
changing market conditions demand an urgent response and vacancies have to be filled as 
quickly as possible. Secondly, firms using THAs will save on a series of activities related to 
selection, follow-up of potential candidates, hiring and training of workers. Thirdly, these 
intermediary firms represent a professional channel that provides a good match between the 
job and the worker’s capabilities, leading to greater labor productivity for the client firm. 
Fourthly, THAs continuously promote the experience and employability of the worker, thus 
generating an efficient combination of practical training and knowledge for the worker with 
productive results for the client firm. In Spain, Law 29/1999, of June 16, requires THAs to 
provide theoretical and practical training for the workers they supply to their clients. These 
investments in training must create skills in the form of general and versatile resources to be 
used by workers in different contexts. Finally, in Spain the rate with which temporary 
contracts are made permanent is higher among agency workers than among direct workers 
(García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2005; Muñoz-Bullón and Rodes, 2004), and as such, 
agency workers are more motivated and make a greater effort in the hope of obtaining a 
 13 
permanent job. It may therefore be expected that the higher the proportion of indirect 
temporary workers, the greater the positive effect of temporary contracts on organizational 
outcome will be. 
Furthermore, Broschak and Davis-Blake (2006) and Davis-Blake et al. (2003) state 
that temporary workers who are administratively closer to their employers (direct temporary 
workers) have stronger negative effects on permanent workers than do temporary workers 
who are more remote in administrative terms (agency temporary workers). Direct temporary 
hiring gives workers a status of belonging to the firm that is relevant to permanent workers in 
the processes of social comparison and internal equity. Additionally, permanent employees 
may have fewer social contacts with agency workers than with direct employees (Houseman 
et al., 2003). Thus, although there are high turnover rates among workers provided by THAs, 
the negative consequences on the trust and commitment of the permanent workers are 
probably moderated. Compared with direct temporary hiring, indirect temporary hiring does 
not increase the feeling of insecurity among permanent workers to the same extent. It may 
therefore be expected that the concave downward curvilinear effect will be more intense when 
direct rather than indirect temporary contracts are used. We therefore posit that:  
Hypothesis 2. The higher the proportion of indirect temporary contracts in an 
organization, the less concave the downward curvilinear relationship between 
temporary hiring and organizational outcomes will be. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample 
To empirically test the theoretical hypotheses put forward, we used the Survey on 
Business Strategies—Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE). Financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Industry and Energy, the SEPI (Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones 
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Industriales) Foundation is responsible for the Survey’s design and administration through the 
Economic Research Program. The ESEE complements the information from two essential 
statistical sources that have traditionally been available for analyzing Spanish industry: the 
Industrial Survey published by the Spanish National Statistics Institute, and the Bank of 
Spain’s Central Balance Sheet Data Office. One of the most relevant characteristics of the 
ESEE is its representativeness, which means that conclusions drawn from the sample can be 
claimed as valid for the reference population of Spanish manufacturing firms. Firms were 
selected on the basis of a combination of exhaustiveness and random sampling criteria4. 
The reference population for the ESEE is made up of firms with 10 or more workers in 
manufacturing industries, excluding industrial activities related to oil refining and the 
treatment of fuels. The geographical area covers the whole of Spain, and all the variables are 
measured over an annual time frame. In our study, we use data from 2006, the latest period in 
which the complete survey was carried out. From the original sample of firms, cases with 
missing data for any of the study variables were eliminated, together with cases with coding 
errors and non-standard cases that could devalue the information provided for that year, such 
as firms affected by takeover, merger or separation processes. The final sample used in this 
study comprised 1,597 firms, of which 423 do not use temporary hiring. Distribution by 
sector of activity can be seen in Table 3, both through the Standard Industrial Classification 
system (SIC) and the Spanish National Classification of Economic Activities—Clasificación 
Nacional de Actividades Económicas (CNAE). 
    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 3   
------------------------ 
                                                 
4  More detailed information on the Survey on Business Strategies characteristics can be consulted at 
http://www.funep.es/esee/en/einfo_que_es.asp. With some restrictions, the data are publicly available from the 
SEPI Foundation. 
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3.2. Measures 
Control variables. Following the example of studies by Kleinknecht et al. (2006), 
Lepak et al. (2003) and Michie and Sheehan-Quinn (2001), we selected six control variables. 
Firm age was calculated as the number of years from the firm’s foundation to the time of the 
survey. Firm size was defined as the logarithm of the average number of employees. The 
industrial sector was based on the CNAE classification, where 13 sectors of activity were 
identified. The firm’s human capital is the mean of the standardized values of workers’ 
education levels and investment in training. Education level was calculated as the proportion 
of the workforce that had completed intermediate or higher education. Investment in training 
was taken as the ratio of expenditure on training to total average number of workers in the 
firm. Capital intensity was calculated as the ratio of total net fixed assets to average number 
of employees. Finally, innovation intensity was calculated as the percentage coefficient 
between R&D spending and the firm’s sales. The calculation and definition of these variables 
are reported in the annex (Tables I and II).   
Independent variables. Similarly to Michie and Sheehan-Quinn (2001) and Roca-Puig 
et al., (2008a), the temporary hiring level was calculated as the proportion of the workforce 
employed under temporary contracts in an organization. The proportion of indirect temporary 
contracts was calculated as the ratio of workers contracted through THAs to the total 
temporary labor force.  
Dependent variables. Datta et al. (2005) advocate focusing on labor productivity to 
assess organizational outcomes because this indicates the extent to which employees are 
effectively creating output, and isolates them to a certain extent from external variations in 
capital and product markets. As in previous studies (e.g., Datta et al., 2005; Matías-Reche, 
2003), we use the logarithm of the ratio of sales to employees as a measure of labor 
productivity. This measure includes the externally generated benefits to the firm of using 
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temporary hiring. It does not, however, include internally generated benefits of savings in 
efficiency, mainly labor costs. It is therefore appropriate to also use a measure of the firm’s 
profitability that covers the overall benefits (external and internal) of using temporary hiring. 
In this analysis we use the gross operating margin, a measure similar to return on sales (ROS) 
used in previous studies (e.g., Roca-Puig, et al 2008a).  
 
4. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations between the study variables. 
It is worth noting that the average temporary hiring rate of the sample of industrial firms 
analyzed is 14.4%, evidence of a higher use in Spain than in the European Union as a whole, 
which had a temporary employment rate in the manufacturing sector of around 9.5% in 2002 
(EC, 2005). We followed Aiken and West’s (1991) recommendations in examining our 
theoretical hypotheses. This involved centering the independent variables to avoid 
multicollinearity problems between the interaction terms and the variables that constitute 
them. We used a hierarchical regression analysis to select the model that best accounts for 
organizational outcomes and to test the hypotheses. Table 5 shows how the introduction of the 
quadratic term in model 2 for gross operating margin (–0.083) gives rise to a significant 
change in the explained variance between model 1 and model 2. The negative sign indicates a 
concave downward curvilinear relationship between temporary hiring and gross operating 
margin. Thus hypothesis 1 is confirmed. The effect of temporary hiring on gross operating 
margin is less positive when the use of temporary contracts is greater. However, hypothesis 1 
in not confirmed for labor productivity. Even when the regression coefficient for the quadratic 
term is negative, it is not significant. Model 1 offers a better explanation of the relationship 
between temporary contracts and labor productivity, which is revealed as a negative linear 
relationship (–0.081). Figure 2 shows this relationship.   
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    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 4   
------------------------ 
    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 5   
------------------------ 
    ----------------------- 
Insert Figure 2   
------------------------ 
To clarify understanding of the results, Aiken and West (1991) recommend using a 
figure to illustrate a curvilinear relationship within the range of representative values for the 
sample of firms analyzed—at one standard deviation below and one above the mean value of 
the independent variable—. Therefore, in Figure 3 we show the relationship between centered 
temporary hiring and gross operating margin within the range of values from –0.16 to 0.16. 
We can appreciate a predominantly positive concave downward curvilinear relationship 
between these variables as the maximum of the curve (0.23)—optimal level of temporary 
contracts—falls outside the meaningful range of the data and a negative relationship does not 
therefore appear.   
    ----------------------- 
Insert Figure 3   
------------------------ 
To examine hypothesis 2, we removed the firms that do not use temporary contracts 
from the initial sample, which left a total of 1,174 firms for this analysis. The average 
temporary hiring rate of this new sample of industrial firms analyzed is 19.67% (s.d. 0.158) 
and the mean of the indirect temporary contracts is 0.202 (s.d. 0.323). The Spanish firms’ 
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preference for direct temporary hiring highlighted by De la Calle et al. (2007) is clearly 
observed. Table 6 shows a significant change in the explained variance between model 2 and 
model 3 for gross operating margin5 . A positive and significant interaction can be seen 
between the proportion of temporary contracts and that of indirect temporary contracts 
(0.097), and a positive and significant interaction between temporary contracts squared and 
the proportion of indirect temporary contracts (0.176). In consequence, the indirect contracts 
variable is seen to moderate the curvilinearity of the relationship of temporary contracts to 
gross operating margin. Hypothesis 2 is thus confirmed; that is, the concave downward 
curvilinear relationship is more pronounced with a low level of proportion of indirect 
temporary contracts in an organization.  
. ------------------------ 
Insert Table 6   
------------------------ 
In Table 7 and Figure 3 we show the simple regression equations characterizing this 
curvilinear relationship for low and high values of indirect temporary contracts. According to 
Aiken and West (1991), this involves dichotomizing the indirect temporary variable, choosing 
one standard deviation below (–0.323) and one above (0.323) the corresponding mean value. 
We can observe that when the proportion of indirect temporary contracts is low, the 
relationship of temporary contracts to gross operating margin is concave downward 
curvilinear. As indirect temporary contracts increase, this curvilinear relationship changes 
markedly and becomes a concave upward curvilinear relationship at a high level of indirect 
temporary contracts. In both cases the turning point—maximum (–0.020) to a concave 
downward curve and minimum (–0.109) to a concave upward curve—falls within the range of 
representative values for the firm sample, which enables us to appreciate, respectively, an 
                                                 
5 Results for labor productivity are reported in table 6 for information purposes and to verify that the results do 
not differ from those obtained when the whole sample is used. Given that previously no curvilinear relationship 
had been confirmed, there are no grounds, logically, for hypothesis 2.  
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inverted U-shaped function and a U-shaped function. All these data provide empirical 
evidence, as predicted in hypothesis 2, that the concave downward curvilinear relationship of 
temporary contracts to gross operating margin is more intense in direct than indirect 
temporary contracts.  
    ----------------------- 
Insert Table 7   
------------------------ 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Although the curvilinear relationship involves a greater degree of complexity 
compared with simpler linear paradigms, it enhances and makes a value-added contribution to 
the theory and practice because it accounts for a wide range of inconsistent and apparently 
paradoxical findings in the management literature (Pierce and Aguinis, 2013). Based on the 
labor flexibility literature, this study proposes the existence of a curvilinear relationship 
between temporary contracts and organizational outcomes. Specifically, we suggest there is a 
concave downward curvilinear relationship between these two variables, which has a positive 
effect in firms with a lower proportion of temporary contracts, since the benefits of using 
these contracts outweigh their costs. In contrast, the costs incurred by firms with a high 
proportion of temporary contracts outweigh their benefits; this reduces the positive effect and 
may even lead to a negative effect. This is essentially because a high proportion of temporary 
contracts in a firm substantially increases the disadvantages or costs of temporary hiring, 
especially the negative attitudes of permanent workers towards the organization (Broschak 
and Davis-Blake 2006; De Cuyper et al., 2009; George, 2003; Sanchez and Toharia, 2000). 
Our study provides partial evidence for this hypothesis, since it is only confirmed when the 
gross operating margin is considered; in contrast, when examining labor productivity a 
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negative linear relationship emerges. Moreover, within the range of representative values of 
the firm sample analyzed a predominantly positive concave downward curve is seen between 
temporary contracts and gross operating margin; in other words, even when we consider a 
high use of temporary contracts a negative relationship does not emerge. Consequently, in 
contrast to the positions held by Cardon (2003), Foote and Folta (2002) and Toharia (2005), 
we do not find that there is an optimal proportion of temporary contracts that maximizes 
organizational outcomes. This curve does not have a point of inflection. 
Otherwise, we can see how an increase in temporary hiring raises gross operating 
margin, but at the same time reduces labor productivity. This seems to point to a certain 
conflict of objectives. From a managerial point of view, the final decision will probably 
depend to some extent on the competitive strategy the firm pursues (Michie and Sheehan-
Quinn, 2001). Firms with an aggressive position and whose basic competitive priority is to 
increase their market share, even at the expense of lower efficiency, should consider reducing 
their proportion of temporary contracts. In contrast, if they pursue a defensive position in 
which their basic competitive priority is to minimize costs, even at the expense of a decline in 
market share, it would be more appropriate to increase their temporary contract rate.  
Likewise, given that the measure of labor productivity represents the external effect—
through income—of temporary hiring, and the gross operating margin represents the overall 
effect (external and internal), we can infer from the difference observed between the two that 
the main advantage firms obtain through the use of temporary contracts is in substantial 
savings in labor costs. This finding coincides with previous studies (e.g., Kleinknecht et al., 
2006; Rodríguez-Gutiérrez, 2007) in which the use of temporary contracts leads to savings on 
wage bills, but does not translate into higher sales. Consequently, in Spain the difference 
between severance payments for temporary and permanent workers is known to be high, and 
this is the key to understanding the success of temporary contracts (Díaz-Mayans and Sanchez, 
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2004; Dolado et al., 2002; ICEDS, 2005). Similarly, results show that the internal and 
external effects of temporary hiring are incompatible, as they substitute one another (Blyton 
and Morris, 1992; Kleinknecht et al., 2006; Michie and Sheehan-Quinn, 2001). The positive 
link to labor cost savings may explain the use of temporary contracts by some employers, but 
may be to the detriment of other aspects of firm performance, such as sales. It therefore comes 
as no surprise that most temporary employees contracted by Spanish firms typically earn low 
wages, have a low educational level, work in precarious conditions, and that temporary 
employment is not used to screen for movement into permanent employment (Amuedo-
Dorantes, 2001; Diaz-Mayans and Sánchez, 2004). These characteristics make it difficult to 
capitalize on the advantages (i.e. external effect) of using temporary employment foreseen by 
Cardon (2003), Houseman (2001) and Matusik and Hill (1998). 
From the comparative analysis between the direct and indirect forms of temporary 
hiring, firstly we show that the concave downward curvilinear relationship between temporary 
contracts and gross profit margin is increasingly manifested as the proportion of indirect 
contracts decreases. When the proportion of indirect temporary contracts is low the 
relationship of temporary contracts to gross operating margin is concave downward 
curvilinear. As the proportion of indirect temporary contracts increases, the relationship of 
temporary contracts to gross operating margin becomes concave upward curvilinear. In both 
scenarios, a point of inflection is seen and a negative relationship coexists with a positive 
relationship. This result provides evidence that the curvilinear relationship between temporary 
contracts and organizational outcomes differs according to the proportion of temporary 
agency employment in relation to direct-hire temporaries. 
We can appreciate that the concave downward curvilinear relationship is typical of 
firms that mainly use direct hiring arrangements, and is not found in firms that use indirect 
hiring. Only in the case of high direct temporary contract use, and when the gross operating 
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margin is analyzed as a dependent variable, our results support the arguments of Broschak 
and Davis-Blake (2006), Cardon (2003), Foote and Folta, (2002), George (2003) and Roca-
Puig et al., (2008b) in that the excessive use of temporary contracts by a firm leads to a sharp 
decline in its organizational outcomes, and a negative relationship thus appears. As we can 
see in Figure 3, the maximum of the curve falls within the range of representative values for 
the firm sample analyzed. Consequently, in this context, we can find an optimal proportion of 
temporary contracts that maximizes organizational outcomes. Finally, the figure also shows 
that in a context of high temporary hiring, the claim made by Houseman (2001) and Muñoz-
Bullón and Rodes (2004) becomes particularly relevant, namely that firms using the indirect 
temporary hiring approach obtain a higher level of organizational outcomes than those hiring 
temporary workers directly. Intermediation by THAs brings additional advantages to user 
firms as compared to firms that take on the task of hiring temporary workers themselves 
(Broschak and Davis-Blake, 2006; Houseman et al., 2003; Mitlacher, 2007). Given the high 
rate of temporary hiring in Spain, and the fact that Spanish firms use direct hiring more than 
other methods, they are seen to be missing out on the advantages that temporary workers 
supplied by THAs bring (De la Calle et al., 2007). Our results suggest that Spanish companies 
should substitute direct-hire temporaries for agency temporaries if they use temporary 
workers intensively. In this context, the claim made by various public and private institutions 
(e.g., the Spanish government, CIETT) that THAs are effective and efficient agents to 
revitalize the labor market and contribute to improving firms’ competitiveness appears to be 
particularly valid.  
The high rate of temporary hiring in Spain means that our results are limited to the 
Spanish context. We need to understand issues of labor flexibility within existing national 
institutional frameworks (Blyton and Martínez-Lucio, 1995). It would therefore be interesting 
to replicate this investigation in other countries with different rates of temporary hiring, 
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conducting comparative studies, such as that of Tregaskis and Brewster (2006), which assess 
the convergence or divergence of the impact of temporary contracts on firms’ efficacy in 
different countries. Similarly, it should be highlighted that our empirical results are limited to 
the manufacturing sector. Future research could be carried out in other economic activities, 
such as services sector subject to large seasonal and cyclical demand fluctuations with a 
higher rate of temporary employment (EC, 2005; Houseman, 2001), where a more acute 
concave downward curvilinear relationship between temporary contracts and labor 
productivity may be expected. Likewise, THAs have a greater rate of penetration in the 
services sector, which could affect the results of analyses comparing indirect and direct 
temporary contracts.  
In addition, this study was conducted exclusively at the organizational level. Future 
research in the field of labor flexibility could usefully adopt a multilevel approach, by 
integrating the individual and organizational levels that have been considered as separate 
approaches. Studies focusing on the individual level (e.g., De Cuyper et al., 2009; Mauno et 
al., 2012), originating from the field of psychology, set out to demonstrate the influence of 
certain behaviors and attitudes held by temporary workers about their work performance, but 
neglect the organizational context in which these processes take place. Studies focusing on the 
organization (e.g., Lepak et al. 2003; Valverde et al. 2000), grounded on economic 
approaches, explore the influence of this employment mode on organizational outcomes, 
without taking into account the essential role of employees as a critical organizational 
resource to explain this relationship. Integrating the two perspectives could contribute to 
advancing the field of human resource management (Ostroff and Bowen, 2000). Lastly, it 
should be noted that our empirical analyses only estimate relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables, but do not indicate any causality. 
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7. ANNEX 
Table I. Variable calculations  
Variables Mathematical functions 
Firm age 2006 – AEMP 
Firm size Lg (PNEM + EVENME + PERETT) 
Sectors of activity  NACECLIO 
Innovation intensity  IDV 
Human capital  Mean [standardized (GEFT / (PNEM + EVENME + PERETT)), standardized (100 – PNT)] 
Capital intensity IN / (PNEM + EVENME + PERETT) 
Proportion of temporary contracts (EVENME + PERETT) / (PNEM + EVENME + PERETT) 
Proportion of indirect temporary contracts PERETT / (EVENME + PERETT) 
Labor productivity Lg (PBSOI / (PNEM + EVENME + PERETT)) 
Gross operating margin MBE 
 
Note: a Advice was sought from the SEPI Foundation on these calculations, particularly those relating to the number of workers. The total labor force of the 
manufacturing firms (firm size) was calculated in full-time equivalents, taking into account the variability and duration of the temporary contract (i.e., when 
temporary workers are only employed for a few months). The innovation intensity and gross operating margin variables were calculated by the SEPI Foundation 
directly. 
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Table II. Identification of the ESEE variablesa 
ESEE Code Definition  
AEMP Year the firm was created.   
EVENME Average number of casual workers.b This is calculated as the simple mean 
of the casual workers in each quarter, when this number has changed 
significantly, or is based on the number of casual workers at the end of the 
year when the company reports that this number has not changed 
significantly.  
PERETT Average number of workers supplied by temporary agencies.c  
PNEM Average number of regular workers. This is calculated by identifying the 
average of non-casual personnel at the end of the previous year and at the 
end of the current year. When the regular workforce experienced 
significant changes during the year, the regular workforce used is the 
average at the end of each quarter adjusted for the presence of part-time 
workers.  
NACECLIO Firm’s main activity. 
IDV  Percentage of sales volume represented by total R&D expenditure. 
IN Total net fixed assets.  
GEFT Total value of external expenditure on employee training. 
PNT Percentage of total personnel represented by non-graduate personnel. 
PBSOI Production and other incomes. Total sales, the variation in stocks for sale 
and other current management income. 
MBE Gross operating margin. Firm’s profitability, defined as the percentage of 
total sales plus their variation in stocks and other current management 
income represented by total sales, variation in stocks and other current 
management income minus purchases, external services and labor costs. 
 
Notes:    
a  We used the original codes and definitions provided by the SEPI Foundation in order to facilitate 
understanding of the variables included in the study. 
 b  Temporary workers supplied by THAs are not included.  
 c  An equivalent calculation is to divide the number of hours all THA employees work in the year 
by the normal annual working hours of an employee in the firm as stipulated by agreements or 
legislation. These two variables also appear in the ESEE. 
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 Table 1. Distribution of Spanish temporary workers by economic activity, 2008-2012. (Units: 1000 workers) 
Activity 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 
Total 3364.6 3489.4 3621.5 3745.6 3825.9 
Agriculture 254.9 251.7 250.1 248.1 248.8 
Industry 351.9 357.4 364.5 373.7 383.9 
Construction 291.0 316.3 347.3 380.0 419.6 
Services 2466.9 2564.0 2659.8 2744.0 2773.7 
Source: Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA), National Statistics Institute (INE) 
 
 Table 2. European agency work penetration rates by countries, 2004-2008. 
Country 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 
France 2.3% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
Germany 2.0% 1.6% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 
Italy 0.9% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
The Netherlands 2.9% 2.8% 2.5% 2.2% 1.9% 
Spain 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7% 0.7% 
United Kingdom 4.1% 4.8% 4.5% 4.3% 4.2% 
Source: International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (CIETT, 2010) 
Note: The penetration rate of agency work describes the number of agency workers (full time equivalent) 
 in relation to the country’s total workforce. 
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 Table 3. Distribution of firms by sectors of activity (N = 1,597) 
SIC CNAE Number Percentage 
20 and 21 DA. Food, drink and tobacco industry 201 12.59% 
22 and 23 DB. Textile and clothing industry 130 8.14% 
31 DC. Leather and footwear industry 42 2.63% 
24 and 25 DD. Timber and cork industry 59 3.69% 
26 and 27 DE. Paper industry; publishing, graphic arts and reproduction of engravings 138 8.64% 
28 DG. Chemical industry 106 6.64% 
30 DH. Rubber transformation and plastic materials industry 80 5.01% 
32 DI. Other mineral, non-metallic product industries 122 7.64% 
33 and 34 DJ. Primary metal industry and manufacturing of metal products  264 16.53% 
35 and 36 DK. Machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing industry 113 7.08% 
38 DL. Electrical, electronic and optical materials and equipment industry 114 7.14% 
37 DM. Manufacturing of transportation equipment industry 118 7.39% 
39 DN. Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 110 6.89% 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 1,597)    
Variables Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Firm age 27.924 20.804 1        
2. Firm size (log) 1.856 0.639 0.339
*** 1       
3. Innovation intensity 0.762 2.230 0.070*** 0.185*** 1      
4. Human capital 0.000 0.738 0.137*** 0.229*** 0.245*** 1     
5. Capital intensity 62374.7 117078.6 0.145*** 0.267*** 0.028 0.181*** 1    
6. Temporary contracts 0.144 0.160 –0.124*** 0.107*** –0.009 –0.042 –0.054** 1   
7. Labor productivity (log) 5.106 0.356 0.233*** 0.497*** 0.084*** 0.283*** 0.443*** –0.047 1  
8. Gross operating margin 8.041 13.294 0.008 0.034 0.028 0.094*** 0.118*** 0.032 0.220*** 1 
Note:  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
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Table 5. Results of hierarchical regression analyses (N = 1,597) 
Variables Labor productivity Gross operating margin 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm age 0.031 0.031 –0.011 –0.009 
Firm size 0.363
*** 0.362*** –0.013 –0.025 
Food, drink and tobacco industry 0.019 0.019 0.016 0.016 
Textile and clothing industry –0.206
*** –0.205*** –0.096** –0.091** 
Leather and footwear industry –0.049
** –0.049** –0.019 –0.017 
Timber and cork industry –0.066
*** –0.066*** –0.033 0.033 
Paper industry –0.055
** –0.055** 0.062** 0.064** 
Chemical industry 0.045
** 0.046** –0.020 –0.016 
Rubber transformation and plastic industry –0.054
** –0.054** 0.014 0.014 
Other mineral, non-metallic product industries –0.046
** –0.047** 0.020 0.019 
Machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing industry –0.027 –0.026 –0.004 –0.002 
Electrical, electronic, optical and equipment industry –0.037
* –0.037* 0.016 0.017 
Manufacturing of transportation equipment industry –0.009 –0.009 –0.074
** –0.071** 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries –0.094
*** –0.094*** –0.015 –0.014 
Innovation intensity –0.038* –0.038** 0.023 0.019 
Human capital 0.108
*** 0.108*** 0.068** 0.067** 
Capital intensity 0.287
*** 0.287*** 0.100*** 0.102*** 
Temporary contracts –0.081*** –0.076*** 0.044* 0.106*** 
Temporary contracts squared  –0.007  –0.083** 
  R2 (∆R2) 0.424  0.424 (0.000) 0.044 –0.047 (0.003)** 
  F 64.569*** 61.137
*** 4.001*** 4.082
*** 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Table 6. Results of hierarchical regression analyses (N = 1,174) 
Variables Labor productivity Gross operating margin 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Firm age 0.025 0.025 0.023 –0.009 –0.008 –0.005 
Firm size 0.356
*** 0.356*** 0.356*** –0.034 –0.034 –0.038 
Food, drink and tobacco industry 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.030 0.027 
Textile and clothing industry –0.177
*** –0.177*** –0.177*** –0.075** –0.069** –0.070* 
Leather and footwear industry –0.010 –0.010 –0.009 –0.028 –0.026 –0.025 
Timber and cork industry –0.047
** –0.047** –0.048** –0.024 –0.024 –0.022 
Paper industry –0.045
* –0.045* –0.044* 0.123*** 0.126*** 0.119*** 
Chemical industry 0.046
* 0.046* 0.047* –0.003 –0.003 –0.001 
Rubber transformation and plastic industry –0.056
** –0.056** –0.057** 0.027 0.026 0.022 
Other mineral, non-metallic product industries –0.052
** –0.052** –0.050** 0.052 0.051 0.049 
Machinery and electrical equipment manufacturing industry –0.002 –0.002 –0.005 –0.028 –0.031 0.026 
Electrical, electronic, optical and equipment industry –0.034 –0.034 –0.039 0.022 0.024 0.023 
Manufacturing of transportation equipment industry 0.008 0.008 0.008 –0.041 –0.039 –0.040 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries –0.078
*** –0.078*** –0.078*** –0.013 –0.010 –0.010 
Innovation intensity –0.053** –0.053** –0.054** 0.007 0.004 0.008 
Human capital 0.086
*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.062* 0.062* 0.059* 
Capital intensity 0.325
*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.106*** 
Proportion indirect contracts 0.086
*** 0.086*** 0.121*** -0.052* -0.046 -0.064 
Temporary contracts –0.075*** –0.075** –0.081** 0.008 0.066 0.093** 
Temporary contracts squared  0.001 –0.043  –0.077* 0.088 
Temporary contracts x proportion indirect contracts   0.013   0.097
** 
Temporary contracts squared x proportion indirect contracts   –0.069   0.176** 
  R2 (∆R2) 0.479  0.479 (0.000) 0.480 (0.001) 0.051 0.054 (0.003) * 0.062 (0.008) ** 
   F 55.909*** 53.067
*** 48.340*** 3.291*** 3.306*** 3.437
*** 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Table 7. Simple regression equations of the effect of temporary contracts (X) on gross 
operating margin (Y)  
N = 1,597 (Model 2) N = 1,174 (Model 3) 
Y = -18.901** X
2 + 8.729*** X + 9.213 
High indirect contracts: Y = 66.423** X2 + 14.535*** X + 8.231 
Low indirect contracts: Y = -30.645** X2 - 1.255 X + 9.679 
Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients  *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 (two-tailed) 
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Figure 1. Temporary work in selected European Union countries 
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Figure 2. Effect of temporary hiring on labor productivity 
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Figure 3. Effect of temporary hiring on gross operating margin 
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